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Let me start with a simple statement: there’s something like a spatial 
environment inherent in the traces of memory
1. Introduction: the shared destiny of time and space. 
1
                                                 
1 Paul Ricœur, La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oublie (Seuil, Poche Essais, 2000), 184. 
. As we remember the past to try to tell it 
to someone close to us, memories of joy will be attached to the rooms and objects of our 
childhood house, ideas and feelings of wonder will be found linked to the spaces of that 
museum once visited, friendship will be linked to, say, a table in a café, love to a hotel 
near the sea, peace to a landscape that once captured our heart, disappointment to a 
closed door of a monument we so wanted to visit, fatigue to that bench we sat on when 
we were lost, far from our hotel in that city that we visited for the first time. In each 
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case, these places are never something we add to an already complete memory of 
something; quite on the contrary, when we remember, it is as if memory were made in 
those places, as if it were built-up by being anchored to these spaces, and as if, so to 
speak, time and space were always bound together. Memory thus seems to show the 
intertwining of time and space. Moreover, as we revisit some of those places, some 
memories became clearer and others only then are discovered.  They are made in those 
places and memory seems to be kept by these places, as if waiting for our return to 
present us with our own memories. All this implies that memory is never placeless.  
This seems to be true not only from an individual point of view, but also from a 
collective perspective. Because our memories are something that we share, they are 
always, at the same time, something intimate and connected with the memories of 
others.  In fact, it is often hard to know precisely where our memories end and the 
memories of others begin. In this sense, to share memories with those that are closed to 
us is just a few steps away from “collective memory” with its commemorations that are 
linked to – in the well known expression from P. Nora - “places of memory.” In these 
places full of time, the relation between space and memory is, as Halbwachs shows, a 
double one: on the one hand, space is the material reference where the images of what is 
no longer present are anchored; on the other, space becomes an archive for actualized 
(imagined, transformed) memories, hence giving the groups the chance to access a time 
of belonging.  
Memory - both personal and collective – has its geography. It has its own 
spatiality. In this sense, we are going to argue that memory, usually analysed primary 
from the point of view of time, demands to be approached from the point of view of 
space.  
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2. The memory of the body. 
To approach the space/time relation “on the side of space”, we can begin by 
turning to E. Casey’s2 project of a phenomenology of place. Here, the first level of 
analysis brings us to consider, as an original reference, the spatiality of the body; that is 
to say, we start from the original strangeness of being a body always requested by 
space, of being a body whose experiences all convey – as Merleau-Ponty puts it – an 
“already acquired spatiality.”3
This acquired spatiality is revealed, before any explicit thematisation, in the way 
the lived dimension of the body
 
4 merges with the lived logic of space.5
For the body, to be in place is to occupy the centre of an oriented space. It is to 
be in relation to that corporal centre that is impossible for usto leave and that we 
constantly carry with us.  It is in terms of this centre that the basic dissymmetrical 
relations and structures of space are sketched. As E. Casey explains, we must first of all 
consider here “the binary character of these structures” as they reflect “upright posture, 
the bilaterality of our body (its dissymmetricality of organs and functions) and, more 
generally, the function of the lived body as a basis of orientation.”
 This fact is first 
found in that enigmatic synchronized familiarity composed by the lived body’s 
perceptive and motor dispositions and by the lived space that constantly encourages 
certain gestures, postures, movements and choices in the lived body. 
6
                                                 
2 Edward Casey, Getting Back into Place, (2nd ed., Indiana University Press, Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, 2009). We are following here Ricœur, La mémoire…, 185. 
 This is a key feature 
3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (Gallimard, Paris, 1945), 293. 
4 Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie, 90. 
5 Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie, 61.  
6 Casey, Getting Back…, 48. 
 
 
4 
 
 
since “in keeping with its own ambidextrous proclivities, this body tends toward 
bifurcation (not to be confused with geometric bisection), arranging its choices, 
directions, and movements, as right-left, near-far, up-down, above-below,” here-there, 
etc. 7 These structures and postures, along with the axes of interest they inscribe in 
space, disclose a space that is never, for the body, a neutral, and homogenous 
(Cartesian, Euclidian, Newtonian8) reality.  For the body, space has different intensities: 
it can be lived as “light” or “heavy,” “harsh” or “friendly,” “open” or “blocked.” 
Furthermore space is susceptible of gaining different values.9
To be in space as a body means to have a place; but to have a place never equals 
to be located in a fixed point of a neutral extension. By means of the dynamism of the 
body, space is signified by praxic incorporation (the “praktognosie”
  We extend our “right 
hand” to those we respect, we despise those who “come crawling,” we admire those 
who “look you in the eye,” and we despise those who stab us in the “back.”  Even in the 
darkest of moments, we want to get back “on our feet,” we will never “give way” the to 
difficulties that “face” us, and we will “rise” to the occasion.  
10 Merleau-Ponty 
talks about), that is to say, by the “architectonics of a corporality that is (…) the 
architecture of the world.”11
                                                 
7 Casey, Getting Back…, 48. 
 The way of being of the body is the measure of a 
“spatiality of situation” that is phenomenologically different from the partes extra 
partes of a “spatiality of localization.” The axes of such a measure are the corporal 
schema understood as an intersensorial and intercorporal organizations of 
8 Ricoeur, La mémoire…, p. 185. 
9 O. F., Bollnow, Hombre et espacio (spanish translation, Biblioteca Universitaria Labor, Barcelona, 
1969), 49. 
10 Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie, 164 
11 Emmanuel de Saint Aubert, « Espace et schéma corporel dans la philosophie de la chair de Merleau-
Ponty », in Alain Berthoz, Bernard Andrieu (org.) Le corps en acte (Presse Universitaire de Nancy, 
2010), 126. 
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implications.12 That is to say, the body we are is deeply involved in space to the point 
that its cohesion varies to the rhythm of the relation of our intertwining with it. Thus, if 
the body is a measure of space,13 it is such insofar as the body is already intertwined 
with (demanded, situated by) the space a person belongs to. In other words, the body is 
a measure of space only to the extent that a person is part of space, i.e., involved in it.  
This means that he finds in it the other side of his active being-in-the-world. 
Consequently, the body is a condition of the phenomenality of space because the person 
is always already within what he is conditioning; that is to say, he conditions only 
because he is previously conditioned by what he conditions; he is a measure only 
because he is measured by what he measures. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the body is a 
topological “open unity.” It is a “knot of lived significations”14 that we must recognize 
as a correlative of an “open unity.” What we confront here is a “unity of style more than 
of significance, a unity that characterizes the world.”15
Such a correlation, such a mutual involvement of body and space, sustains an 
original flow of time and memory. Where else, but in the way the body is made a 
“constant” and “durable” act of dis-position, co-respondance by the constant and 
archaic – pre-personal, anonymous - demands of space, could we find the first sketches 
of time and memory? To show this, we have to analyze the “memory of the body” that 
 
                                                 
12 Saint Aubert, « Espace et schéma corporel … », 124; 128-129. See Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie…, 
114. 
13 Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie…, 161 : «La conscience est l’être à la chose par l’intermédiaire du 
corps. Un mouvement est appris lorsque le corps l’a compris, c’est-à-dire lorsqu’il l’a incorporé à son 
‘monde’, et mouvoir son corps c’est viser à travers lui les choses, c’est laisser répondre à leur sollicitation 
qui s’exerce sur lui sans aucune représentation.»   
14 Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie…, 177. 
15 Renaud Barbaras, « De la phénoménologie du corps à l’ontologie de la chair », in Jean-Christophe 
Goddard Le corps (Vrin, Paris, 2005), 227. Renaud Barbaras Le tournant de l’expérience. Recherches sur 
la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty(Vrin, Paris, 1998), 95-136.  
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appears when the body in its familiarity echoes an immemorial time of an active 
belonging to a space that exists before it and that marks our place in it.  
The memory of the body can not be understood as a representation of 
cognitively defined events from the past. The body does not absorb the past in a 
thematic manner.  Rather, the body is correlative to the style of a world that pre-
reflexively spatializes it. In this sense, the memory of the body must first be founded on 
our body movements.16
As Merleau-Ponty points out, following a long tradition of authors such as de 
Maine de Biran, Felix Ravaisson, or Henri Bergson, an analysis of the phenomenon of 
habit is, in this context, of the utmost importance. In fact, in habit, as Merleau-Ponty 
demonstrates,
 The acquired spatiality that the body is immemorially made of 
consists of our movements as our body pre-reflectively replies to the interpellations of 
space. In this sense, body memory can only be understood as the re-actualization and 
re-enactment of gestures, postures, movements, dynamic dispositions and 
correspondences. Such gestures, postures, movements and dynamic correspondences 
must, then, be recognized as traces of the pre-personal interpellations of space.  
17 we find something like an “implicit memory”18
                                                 
16 Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie…, 167.  
 that only the body can 
remember. For example, as I write this phrase on my computer, neither do I explicitly 
know which finger presses each key (and, if I begin to worry about this, I will most 
certainly stop writing), nor do I explicitly know where all the keys are. Typing rapidly 
“without looking” exhibits bodily memory since it depends on a constant re-enactment 
of movements that – so to speak – only the body knows.  It manifests bodily memory 
because only the body can keep and actively repeat all those movements that are the 
17 Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie…, 169. 
18 Thomas Fuchs « Body memory and the Unsconscious », in D. Lohmar, J. Brudziňska (ed.) Founding 
Psychoanalysis Phenomenologically, Phaenomenologica vol. 199 (2012), 69-82 
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traces of a correlation (started before any thematic thought) with an always enquiring 
space. What we confront here is not a thematic and cognitive knowledge. It is also not a 
simple automatism, a simple mechanical response to an outside stimulus.  These 
remembered movements and re-actualized responses are always immediately my own: 
they are rooted in my body’s being-in-the-world, that is to say, in the way my body 
knows space and responds to it as to the other side of its own active capabilities. What is 
here in question is simply a “knowledge that is in the hands,”19
 
 a kind of implicit 
knowing what to do that we can only explain by the fact that we are a remembering 
body, i.e., an active body defined by the capability to re-actualize the tacit presence of a 
lived spatial past.  
 
Bachelard has convincingly showed in La poétique de l’espace that such a lived 
correlation between body and space is the basic reference of dwelling. When we dwell 
we establish with, say, a house, a kind of relation in which the body incorporates the 
house by responding to the way the house comes to inscribe itself “physically on us” by 
becoming a “group of organic habits.”
3. The memory of the house  
20 For example, in visiting the house where we 
grew up, we run up the stairs; and “after twenty years and despite all the anonymous 
stairs, we rediscover the reflexions of the ‘first stair’; we do not step into it a bit too 
high. The being of the house unfolds, faithful to our being.”21
                                                 
19 Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie…, p. 168. 
 As this example indicates, 
the house has inscribed in us the functions of dwelling within it.  It has made us into a 
20 Gaston Bachelard, La poétique de l’espace, (8 ed. P.U.F., Paris, 1974), 32.  
21 Bachelard, La poétique…, 32. 
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diagram of its own polarities, structures, and references: to go inside and to go outside, 
to find shelter, do be emplaced, unplaced, displaced, to be lodged, to be comfortable, to 
be protected, to let the light enter, to close the windows, to feel safe from the outside 
world, etc. In the pact of mutual belonging, intertwining and mixture thus sealed, the act 
of dwelling comes into place through the body. Must we then not conclude that the 
memory of the body always finds itself mingled with a memory that seems to belong to 
(and to be gathered and kept by), for example, a house, a room, an object on the table? 
Let us consider Bachelard’s descriptions of the cellar, the attic, the drawers, the 
chest, the door, the windows.  These items unfold imaginatively; we recognise them as 
kinds of anchors of the past: “all the past comes to live, as if by a dream, in a new 
house”22, writes Bachelard.  He adds a few pages later: “It is thanks to the house that a 
large number of our memories are kept.”23 The space that dwelling places are made of 
is, in its nativeness, the condition of the possibility of the experience of time itself. 
Without our home, our bedroom, our corner, our “hideout,” our storage boxes where a 
life is slowly archived, our chest where lost time can always be found, “intimacy would 
not have any model”24
                                                 
22 Bachelard, La poétique…, 35. 
 and memory would remain lost.  It would be a void without these 
physical anchoring points. Time appears in objects, rooms, stairs, on a balcony, on a 
chair, in certain smells and shapes. Dwelling places are therefore fundamental and 
decisive elements of the experience of time. Thus Bachelard’s claim is that when we 
return to the places that we have called “home,” we find them holding memories for us, 
allowing us to constantly rest in the intimacy of the past. Places like our home – but also 
our city, our street, our neighbourhood, our landscapes - play an important role 
23 Bachelard, La poétique…, 27. 
24 Bachelard, La poétique…, 83. 
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regarding time since they hold the memory of our mingling with space.  In Blanchard’s 
words, such places “in my presence (…) release these memories that belong as much to 
the place as to my brain or body.”25
 
 
 There is more to be said about dwelling. Following Ricoeur, we can say that an 
analysis of dwelling places (and consequently an analysis of the memory held by those 
places) exhibits that fact that the geometric space of built-up places is inserted between 
the lived corporal space and its surrounding public space.
4. The memory of the city. 
26
This is an aspect that Ricoeur brings forward as he analyses “human space.” In 
order to find human space, Ricoeur argues, we have to surpass the contradictions 
(aporia) that are similar to those that time exhibits.  Such contradictions tend to oppose 
and mutually conceal the conceptions of “geometric” and “lived space.” Human space, 
in fact, can only be found in the rupture and suture of lived and geometric space.
  Thus, the spatial fabric of 
memory involves the consideration of the act of building, 
27
Architecture, according to Ricoeur, must be understood as an operation where “a 
type of intelligibility” prevails that is analogous to the intelligibility that narrative plot
  
Architecture exhibits human space as dwelling.  It does so by manifesting in its 
buildings the “remarkable composition” formed by lived corporal and geometric space.  
28 
yields with regard to time.29
                                                 
25 Casey, Getting Back…, 328 
 In fact, like the narrative intelligibility of human time 
26 Ricoeur, La mémoire…, 186. 
27 Ricoeur, La mémoire…, 186. 
28 Ricoeur, La mémoire…, 186. See our L. A. Umbelino, “Herméneutique, architecture et humanisation de 
l’espace”, in Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religieuses, Strasbourg, t. 91, 1 (2011), 67-81. 
29 Paul Ricoeur, “Architecture et narrativité”, in Urbanisme, nº 303 (1998), 49. 
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(which involves the rupture and suture point of lived time and cosmic time), the act of 
configuration of human space made possible by architecture exhibits the 
 “point of rupture and suture of two levels of apprehension: the built-up 
space is also geometric space, measurable and calculable; its qualification 
as a place of life is superposed and tied to its geometric proprieties in the 
same way that narrated time intertwines together cosmic time and 
phenomenological time.”30
Similar to narrative’s relation to the durée of time, the act of construction gives 
access to human space by a “plot” that is inscribed in the durability of the materials. 
Architecture and urbanism share with narrative the same goal of “intelligibility”: both 
try to give a sensed form to human space.  They bring together in a project with its 
“beginning, middle and an end” otherwise discordant materials and fragmented ideas.  
Narrative and architecture also share the same goal of “inter-textuallity.” Like a 
character in a novel, an architectural proposal confronts other proposals.  The building it 
proposes encounters the schools and influences inscribed in “the network of already 
existing buildings “that will contextualize the new building.”
  
31 Architecture and 
narrative also share the same goal of “reconfiguration.” Like a book that is there to be 
read,32
                                                 
30 Ricoeur, La mémoire…, 186. 
 any built-up space can only be considered to be finished through the meaningful 
and creative appropriation  of those who dwell in them. No architectural or urbanistic 
project is finished - Ricoeur argues - till what was built-up offers itself to its “users” as 
31 Ricoeur, “Architecture et narrativité”, 48. Architecture and urbanism thus put in place, regarding space, 
the three mimesis of narrative. 
32 Paul Ricoeur, Du texte à l’action. Essais d’herméneutique II (Seuil, Points Essais, 1986),  170. 
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an occasion of “reading and re-reading our places of life starting from our way of 
inhabiting.”33
This is an important claim made by Ricoeur. One comprehends oneself not just 
through the interpretation of texts, but also through the plural and attentive 
interpretation of the city where one dwells.
  
34 As it synthesises heterogeneous materials, 
accords what is discordant, enabling the possibilities of signifying human temporal 
experience, the stone “book” of a city offers us alternative ways of giving meanings to 
our action. A city, in this way, can be read as a plot in a book of stone, as Benjamin 
called it.  It can be taken as a book offering its readers alternative ways of understanding 
themselves, opening them up to a spectrum of different, polemic, decentring and 
alternative temporal experiences,35
This allows us to conclude something decisive regarding the spatial fabric of 
memory: The narrative fabric of human space unfolds the narrative fabric of human 
memory in the point “of rupture and suture of two levels of apprehension.”  This is the 
point where we are located by built-up places as we remember our chronotopia and tell 
 this by allowing us to repossess our own human 
temporal existence in creative and meaningful ways. In fact, in the juxtaposition of 
architectonic and urbanistic styles, in the junction of the old and the new, in the 
relations between the monuments and new buildings, in the confrontation of the past of 
a decaying building or street and the promise of a new construction in an empty space, 
memory is kept in a point of rupture and suture between what I experientially live and 
what built-up spaces can live in me as I appropriate them.  
                                                 
33 Ricoeur, “Architecture et narrativité”, 49. 
34 Ricoeur, “Architecture et narrativité”, 51. 
35 Ricoeur, “Architecture et narrativité”, 49.  
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our human history through the plot that built-up spaces offer to us as we try to 
meaningful remember what has been or where we have been. 
 In any building, a sensed duration is inscribed by the durability of the materials. 
This durability preserves the time of the project and the time of construction; it also 
preserves something of the demands, hopes, and styles of the period when it was built, 
of the ways it was used along the years, of the personal and collective events the 
building witnessed. In a way, it is “at the scale of urbanism that we better understand 
the way time works in space”36
 
 – and, we can add, the way space works in time. Any 
built-up place is constructed in a given historical moment. As such, the voice it 
embodies enters into an ongoing dialogue regarding the various influence that shape our 
lived temporality.  This dialogue embraces the worries of the present, the traditions and 
traumas of the past, and the hopes and dreams of the future. It appears in the old 
Cathedral surrounded by a renovated square, the rearrangement of an old 
neighbourhood, the new buildings of ecologically concerned projects, in the void left by 
an old building, and in the ruin bearing the weight of time (of past time in the case of 
the “old” ruins, of a time that never came to be, in the case of the “new” ruins of 
unfinished buildings and streets left vacant by economic crises.  In their reconfiguration 
by those who dwell, a time of memory, history and forgiveness is unfolded in and 
through space. 
Ricoeur wrote that a cemetery in a city is what gives room to absence and, at the 
same time, hides it. To this we would add that it conceals absence but always, thereby, 
4. Final words.  
                                                 
36 Ricoeur, La mémoire…, 187 
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keeps it present. Is this not a fundamental lesson regarding memory? The plot that the 
city opens to its readers, “the histories of life of which monuments bear the traces,”37 
opens us up to a new and much needed perspective on the spatial fabric of human time. 
In the city, different periods in history, their realizations and expectations, persist and 
are kept “in reserve.” They persist where they are inscribed.  They are held in reserve, 
waiting for the right reconfiguration. The decaying building next to the new museum, 
the place where the tree I used to play existed: such things hold the memory of human 
time, a memory inscribed in the durability of the materials that provide the sites for the 
events of human life. Only through them can we retell the dramatic rhythm of what 
counts as a human existence—namely, one that mingles known places, possible places, 
places we nostalgically want to go back to, places we dream of, places we call home, 
places that are returns, places of departures, places of absence, and places of ostensive 
presence. Such retelling bears witness to the fact that there are memories that only the 
spatial traces of past activities and sufferings, of conquests and defeats, and of joy and 
oblivion can preserve and hold in readiness for those who need to keep on telling their 
individual and collective histories. 38
This leads us to our final point: the “dialogue” discussed above is possible only 
if those spatial traces that built-up places hold together are not reduced to “mere 
residues,” but are both preserved and actualized as testimonies of the past—a past that 
can enter into dialogue with the present and the future. Reading “the book of stone” 
involves an obligation save memory both from active forgetfulness and from the danger 
  
                                                 
37 Ricoeur, “Architecture et narrativité”, 51. 
38 We don’t explore here the reference made by Ricoeur to the role of space as an historical figure by 
right as demonstrated by F. Braudel’s project of a geo-history. See P. Ricoeur, La mémoire…, p. 188-191.  
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of repetition.39 In this sense, the city must also be preserved from forgetfulness and 
repetition. Cities are storehouses of our possibilities of experiencing and relating human 
time.  We need cities for the opportunity they offer us to reconstruct our memories.  The 
gift they offer is a memory that allows the new to be actively appropriated, that gives 
room to “curiosity and the worry to re-organize the old to make place for the new”40
 
. 
Without such spaces what would became of our memories? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 This paper aims to meditate on  the possibilities of approaching the phenomenon 
of memory from the point of view of space. In order to approach memory on “the side 
of space.” we will find our first decisive guidelines in E. Casey’s41
 
 project of a 
phenomenology of place, and, most of all, in Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of the 
spatialized lived body. Starting from there, we will then try to show in what way 
memory, in a way, can be said to belong to places. Our point of arriving will be P. 
Ricoeur’s proposals on the narrative dimension of human space as it allows us to 
consider in what sense a building or a city holds a sensed duration by inscribing it in the 
durability of the materials and, at the same time, in the histories of human lives 
                                                 
39 We follow here the way Ricoeur assumes the classic contributions of Freud for the study of de 
resistance to remember in face of traumatic events (Gesammelte Werke de Freud, t. X, S. Ficher Verlag, 
1913-1917, pp. 126-136). Ricoeur is most of all interested in what he means by « travail de mémoire » 
and « compulsion de répétition ». See RICOEUR, P., La mémoire…, p. 84.  
40 P. Ricoeur, “Architecture et narrativité”, p. 51. 
41 Edward Casey, Getting Back into Place, (2nd ed., Indiana University Press, Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, 2009). We are following here Ricœur, La mémoire…, 185. 
